PLAN COLOMBIA AND THE EFFECTS IN NORTHERN
ECUADOR
www.GlobalAware.org
INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATORY FOR PEACE (OIPAZ)
EVALUATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE NORTH OF ECUADOR: 2002
Context | Smuggling | Violence
| Fumigation | Refugees
| Contact
Read this document in original Spanish
CONTEXT
On February 20, 2002 Andrés Pastrana, the President of Colombia,
broke the peace process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC). Shortly thereafter, Alvaro Uribe, a partisan of the paramilitary,
was elected as the new President of Colombia. These two events shattered
illusions of peace and presented military proposals to confront the crisis
in the neighboring country.
New fumigation campaigns and armed opposition were constant in Colombia
during the year 2002, and resulted in displacement of people and refugee
claims.
In the month of June, indigenous people of four Latin American countries
(Colombia, Venezuela, Peru and Ecuador) met in Quito to analyze the situation.
They declared that Plan Colombia is “a smokescreen that conceals
the intention to displace indigenous communities of the Amazon, which
is a region rich in mineral resources, flora and fauna.”
In the international arena there is a continued effort to involve Ecuador
in the internal conflict of Colombia. In October 2002, President Uribe
affirmed that “the armed conflict in his country could destabilize
other Latin American nations, and he requested international assistance
to overcome the current state of violence. He affirmed the need to create
a South American force to confront terrorism and drug trafficking.
In addition, the chief of the Southern Command of the United States stated
during his visit to the Manta Military Base: “the problem that exists
in Colombia is the problem of Ecuador, Brazil, Venezuela, Peru and the
United States, and we can only solve it if we fight together”.
Within Ecuador, two political manifestos of the President of the Republic
led to concerns because they alerted the country to the possible participation
of Ecuador in the Colombian conflict and the worsening of the situation:
In March, the President presented the possibility of “expanding
the objective of the Manta Base to include fighting against terrorism”
, and in July he issued a reformatory order, according to which military
governors will be able to operate in the Ecuadorian provinces that are
affected by the internal conflict in Colombia: Sucumbíos, Carchi
and Esmeraldas.
These political manifestos are accompanied by warnings to armed groups,
that if they intend to cross the border of Ecuador, they will “be
met by bullets”. Also, there are criticisms of human rights organizations
for protecting car thieves and kidnappers. However, the public sees these
as mere statements that will not be followed by concrete actions.
On countless occasions, the editors of the newspaper La Hora of Carchi
echoed the population in requesting the termination of the agreement permitting
the use of the Manta military base because it is implicating Ecuador in
the Colombian conflict. This has a direct impact on the situation of the
border towns in Ecuador. THE ACTORS OF 2002
One indication of the new drive towards military action was the ever-greater
presence of paramilitaries on Ecuadorian territory. News reports of 2002
give account of various events of which the protagonists are the Self-Defense
Units of Colombia (AUC). Among the most important occurrences were:
There was an exchange of shots on the armed, ferro-concrete bridge that
joins the towns of Santa Bárbara and El Playón (Sucumbíos)
with El Carmelo (Tulcán). “According to the villagers, the
incident occurred because “the Colombian paramilitaries set up a
reserve on the bridge and were asking money from drivers that were traveling
in the zone”.
An article dated August 5th in the newspaper La Hora of Esmeraldas presents
a collection of accounts related to paramilitary action in Ecuador. “Colombian
paramilitary groups are entering Ecuadorian territory and offering their
“watch-back” services to rural landowners who show that they
are in danger of being kidnapped by the FARC. In exchange for their patrol
services, the groups are requesting a monthly payment of approximately
$2000.
Other information claims, "there exists evidence of similar armed
groups that operate in Santo Domingo de los Colorados, Cotopaxi and Chimborazo,
and that finance themselves by payments from farmers and cattle raisers.
There have been claims that in provinces such as Sucumbios, supposed collaborators
with the guerilla – both farmers and indigenous people – have
been put to death. Their tied-up bodies have been found close to rivers
or they have been murdered by the AUC, who enter into places firing and
killing indiscriminately. It is also known that the AUC controls zones
of vast jungle and that they rely upon suppliers of food, clothing and
gasoline.”
“According to a Colombian soldier, paramilitaries of Ecuadorian
nationality have also perished in combats with troops of the neighbour
country.
In September 2002, statements were collected from the four paramilitaries
who were arrested in Sucumbios. They confessed to having a specific mission
of converting the city of Lago Agrio into their operations center, with
absolute military control. In their statements, the paramilitaries asserted
that they rely upon the assistance and complicity of the Colombian army.
Also in the month of September, Colombian paramilitaries on board of a
light airplane flew over Ecuadorian air space and distributed flyers inviting
the Ecuadorian people to denounce the leaders of the FARC and to join
to cause of the paramilitaries. They offered compensation of up to two
million dollars, as well as absolute protection for anyone who brought
forward members of the FARC. According to the pamphlets, the FARC operate
in Ecuadorian territory, exercising activities related to drug trafficking.
On September 17, an account in the newspaper La Hora of Carchi affirmed
that from his place of hiding, a paramilitary confessed to the existence
of paramilitaries in Ecuador and activities of this group on Ecuadorian
territory, including assassinations, massacres and drug trafficking. He
affirmed that if there are paramilitaries in Ecuador, it is because there
are also guerilla of the FARC.
For its part, the guerrilla reiterated on numerous occasions that it is
not interested in carrying out military operations outside the borders
of Colombia. These statements were backed up by the Ecuadorian military,
which rejects claims regarding activities of the FARC in Ecuador.
However, the nervousness of the population and the daily use of rumors
as the principal source of information have led to a permanent confusion
of actors and distortion of facts, provoking an even greater sense of
insecurity among the people. This problem is also present in the news,
much of which is based on rumors and generalizations.
On September 15, the newspaper La Hora stated: “The residents of
Carchi claim that the guerrilla, paramilitaries, insurgency groups, drug
traffickers, blackmailed killers and Colombian delinquents have set up
their center of operations and implement taxes and bribes on Ecuadorian
territory.”
IT IS NOT KNOW WHO IN FACT IS INVOLVED …
In some acts of violence, armed actors from the neighboring Republic are
blamed. However, much of the violence is linked to actions of common delinquents
who “take shelter” in the conflict so as to generate fear,
chaos and insecurity.
“A patrol post of the Ecuadorian National Police was ambushed in
the parish of General Farfán, which belongs to the canton of Lago
Agrio in the province of Sucumbios. The result was serious injury of four
Ecuadorian soldiers. According to statements of Colonel Francisco Ramirez,
the Commander of the Provincial Police of Sucumbios, it is not denied
that the incident was linked to common delinquents who operate in the
zone, smuggling fuel or chemicals.”
“Transportation across the highway that connects the parishes that
border on Chical and Maldonado (northwest of Tulcán) has become
dangerous. Three individuals were detained for having blocked the road
by extorting drivers that were traveling in the area. They were transferred
to the detachment of the police, located in Chical. One of them claimed
that they were in the area with the intention of assaulting the drivers
of vehicles. “We were forced by individuals, who claimed to be members
of the guerrilla.”
In San Gabriel, which is part of the canton of Montufar (northern Carchi),
permanent extortion of cattle raisers by armed groups, otherwise know
as “ticketing”, is an open secret among the population. Those
affected are primarily hacienda owners and members of wealthy families.
One man received a letter advising him that if he did not deposit $1,200
every three months, one of his family members would disappear. The letter
was signed by the National Liberation Army (ELN), but no one denies the
fact that it had to do with common delinquents who take on the name of
the ELN in order to carry out their operations. For fear of this “ticketing”,
various contractors have abandoned the province and have decided to settle
in the city of Quito.
The commander of the Batallion of the Galo Molina Infantry, Colonel Wagner
Bravo, confirmed that the Colombian army carried out a persecution on
Ecuadorian territory. On June 18, he handed in a statement to the Governor
of Carchi, Edgar Moscoso. The text stated that there was an armed clash
between the Ecuadorian and the Colombian armies the preceding Thursday.
The report goes on to detail that when the men of the Colombian army were
carrying out a search, they encountered an Ecuadorian patrol. They attacked
in confusion.”
MORE RESOURCES
The situation that the northern neighbor faces has served as a valid excuse
for the Armed Forces and the Police of Ecuador to request a budget increase
on various occasions. Already in March, three months into the new fiscal
year, the Minister of Defense proposed the need for more resources for
security before the Congress.
SMUGGLING OF ARMS
On two occasions, the press of the country has briefly described the police’s
apprehension of Ecuadorian military equipment that was being sent to Colombia.
In the first record of February, “the Police of Sucumbios apprehended
a cargo of Ecuadorian military munitions, with Colombia as its destination.
In total, 70 000 bullets of different calibers were confiscated, among
them 67 000 cartridges: 762 for FAL rifles and 97 projectiles for 40 mm
mortars. The remainder were 9mm bullets.
The second article, entitled “Fake Police Steal Weapons for the
FARC” appeared in the newspaper El Comercio. It pointed out that
the police confiscated weapons and munitions that had a value greater
than $160 000. Those detained for the crime were wearing original uniforms
of the Intervention and Ransom Group (GIR), with names and titles of police
officers.
VIOLENCE IN THE PROVINCES
Sucumbíos
The 2001 International Observatory for Peace (OIPAZ) Report mentions that
between January and September 2002, there were 73 homicides in Sucumbios,
which signifies a monthly average of eight homicides. In the first five
months of 2002, there was a monthly average of 14.6 homicides. In the
subsequent months this average tended to decrease. The most violent month
was May (18), followed by February, April and August (17). The months
with the least deaths were December (1), June (7), July and November (8).
The monthly average of violent deaths for the year 2002 was 11.6.
Between January and May 2002, the monthly averages of 45.4 crimes against
people and 36.6 crimes against property were recorded. ; Meanwhile, between
January and September 2001, a monthly average of 38 crimes against people
and 47 crimes against property were reported.
In response to the increasing violence and the tenacity of the positions
in Colombia, on various occasions measures were proposed to restrict border
crossings. Also, the possibility of a state order for a curfew and closing
of the border in the northern provinces were considered.
In October, the managers of taxi drivers and various social organizations
of Sucumbios met with the Ministry of Governance to discuss the closing
of the international border over the San Miguel River. The measure was
a response to the fact that during the year 2002, 17 taxi drivers were
assaulted and wounded repeatedly, and 11 taxis could not be recovered.
The increase in violence was accompanied by the effects of fumigations.
An article that was published in September reported: “Six fumigation
planes sprayed the shores of the San Miguel River on Ecuadorian territory.
The farmers of the zone denounced the loss of their rice, cacao, plantain,
coffee, cane and crops. All of the vegetation in an area of 3 thousand
hectares was affected. The farmers also denounced the contamination of
water in the region, claiming that people and animals were poisoned, and
many domestic animals such as chickens died. Many people also reported
skin rashes and there were various cases of miscarriage among women.
FUMIGATIONS
The OIPAZ 2001 Report discusses the effects of fumigations on agricultural
production, and on the health of the residents of border provinces. In
2002, the fumigations continued an their effects became more pronounced.
The demands to stop fumigations increased in 2002, although they lacked
sufficient force to stop the actions. At the beginning of the year, the
Andean University Simon Bolivar organized a series of small conferences
on the theme of fumigations in the country. Among those who attended were
social organizations, ecologists, environmental institutions and government
representatives. These events culminated in the mailing of a letter to
President Pastrana, requesting an end to the fumigations.
In February 2002, indigenous people and settlers in Sucumbíos presented
a claim against the company DynCorp, which was contracted by the US Department
of State to fumigate coca cultivations in Colombia for $600 million. According
to the claim of the indigenous people, the company caused damage to the
health of the Ecuadorian population and the cultivations located 5km from
the Ecuador-Colombia border.
“Coincidentally” the same transnational corporation, DynCorp,
was contracted by the Southern Commando of the United States to direct
logistical support in the Manta Base. The company entered the base on
Friday, March 15 with 134 people. According to spokespeople of the Southern
Command, “DynCorp’s entrance was clear and followed the procedure
applied in other bases in the world when subcontracting support services”.
During the year 2002, various actions were undertaken to demand the removal
of the company from the country.
In August 2002, attempts were made to use the World Summit on Sustainable
Development in Johannesburg to denounce the health and economic impacts
of programmes that aim to eradicate illicit cultivations. During the meeting,
the United States succeeded in pressuring to modify the official text.
Instead of condemning the form of eradication, the text proposed “promoting
international cooperation to attack narcotic plants, taking into account
their negative social, economic and environmental effects”.
The representatives of NGOs and social organizations present at the summit
asked that it be specified that sustainable means of eradication be used
so as to guarantee the absence of negative health and environmental effects.
However, it became clear that the United States could not guarantee that
their methods of elimination of the narcotic plants be completely innocuous
for the local populations.
In October, eleven organizations presented the report “Impacts of
Plan Colombia Fumigations in Ecuador”. This document contained evidence
that “fumigations produce an over-stimulation in the central nervous
system that causes headaches, nausea, vomiting, stomach aches and weakness.
They also have severely negative impacts on ecosystems and on the subsistence
methods of the populations of Ecuador and Colombia. The document also
claimed: “it is feared that fumigations cause cancer, mutations,
deformations and miscarriages in the affected population.”.
THE VICTIMS OF A PARADIGM
Between July and December 2002, there were 231 cases of violence in the
province of Esmeraldas. In 56.7 per cent of the cases, the perpetrators
were identified and had nothing to do with the Colombian conflict. Of
these cases, 15 per cent constituted what could be called domestic violence
and conflict originating from intoxication. Four per cent of the cases
of violence were committed by minors, and a similar number of cases of
violence were initiated by the police, the military and security guards.
In only two per cent of the cases the perpetrators were identified as
Colombians.
According to the Police of Sucumbíos, there were 139 assassinations
in 2002. Twenty-nine of the victims (equivalent to 20 per cent) were Colombian
citizens.
The newspaper La Hora of Carchi reported 90 cases of violence during the
year 2002. In 15 per cent of the case those implicated were of Colombian
nationality. Generally, the cases that had to do with drug trafficking
and possession of counterfeited money. The aggressor was not identified
15 per cent of the time. Robberies represented 37 per cent of the cases
and extortions represented nine per cent of the cases.
THE SITUATION USED AS A JUSTIFICATION
An article published in December states: “Four people who were put
to death were accused of having robbed and killed a merchant of Milagro
in the canton of Río Verde, north of Esmeraldas. Around 1000 residents
of seven towns, among them children, formed a crowd that participated
in the persecution, detention, beating and assassination. The local authorities
claimed to be shocked by the event and did not justify the “brutal
act” that was committed; however, they did not criticize it as they
believe that the feeling of insecurity and the violence that is present
in the neighbouring country of Colombia influence people to commit these
acts.
In other December news, “the Commander of the Special Border District
confirmed the detention of a citizen from whom the police seized 20 km
of piping belonging to the Trans-Ecuadorian Oil Pipeline. The Commander
points out that this material is used in the production of homemade land-air
missiles capable of demolishing helicopters and small planes. Ecological
Action, Ecuador’s primary environmental NGO, affirmed that the complaint
of the robbery allowed the petroleum company to avoid its environmental
responsibility of removing materials from abandoned fields.”
GOVERNMENT ACTION
All of the elements that shape the situation on the border are a pretext
for the Government of Ecuador to toughen its position and consolidate
military control over the region. In the case of Sucumbíos, there
have been frequent clashes with the central government over the construction
of the Heavy Crude Pipeline (OCP) .
Government action related to the border manifested itself in three areas:
1. The increase and strengthening of military and police presence in the
zone
2. The closing of border crossings
3. The persecution of Colombians
1. The increase and strengthening of military presence was accomplished
through various strategies:
ß The creation of new detachments in the border zone:
During 2002, the press reported the creation of new detachments in the
border zone: Mataje (in the province of Esmeraldas), Tobar Donoso (on
the border between Esmeraldas and Carchi), El Carmelo (in the province
of Carchi), and Lumbaqui and Santa Cecilia (in the province of Sucumbíos).
The detachment in Mataje uses patrol boats, as well as a helicopter to
conduct aerial patrol.
ß The increase in military and political presence:
In February 2002, there was talk of locating 6000 soldiers on the northern
border. The following May, it was made public that “the ground forces
redistributed their equipment and personnel. They also drafted a mobilization
plan to populate the border with soldiers in case of an emergency, with
the capacity to transfer 4000 additional men in 48 hours.
In the second semester of the year, military and political action intensified
in the provinces of Carchi and Esmeraldas. In August, the police force
was restructured and a single police commander was identified for the
provinces that border on Colombia. This centralized control of administration,
human resources, materials and communications. In December, a high percentage
of the 4000 police officers that were incorporated into this force was
located in the border provinces.
ß Training:
An ongoing activity during 2002 was training of the Armed Forces and the
Police, including courses on guerrilla opposition, combat and patrol tactics.
Among the training activities, one that stands out is the Joint Action
and Training Programme carried out by the Littoral Merchant Navy and the
Colombian Navy.
ß Presence of the army during the construction of infrastructure
for the population:
Two projects were reported in 2002: the construction of basic infrastructure
in San Lorenzo, and the execution of the Integral Border Development Project
in the canton of Putumayo in the province of Sucumbíos. The latter
is part of the border development plan that was approved by the National
Security Council on April 13, 2002. It is financed by the Organization
of American States . 2. Closing of Borders
In the first semester of 2002, there was success in setting a curfew and
closing border crossings. “The Municipality of Lago Agrio dictated
an order to limit the hours of operation of canteens to 8:00pm and liquor
stores to 10:00pm. Also, the police paid surprise visits to 30 motorcycle
mechanics and seized 45 vehicles that did not have documents. .
In the second semester, there was a change in the situation and the attention
moved to the parts of Ecuador that border on the Colombian department
of Nariño: while the violence in the province of Sucumbíos
began to decrease, a bi-national commission was formed in the province
of Carchi to discuss the control of illegal border crossings, as well
as the restriction on movement across the Rumichaca International Bridge
from 10:00pm on. These issues originally surfaced in a proposal presented
by the Provincial Government of Carchi in the preceding months.
When this initiative started in August, it led to of 15% for Ecuadorian
contractors who export their products by land. In the first week of September,
the decision to control the border became more pronounced. It addition
to the restrictions, the closing of the crossing through the Rumichaca
International Bridge starting at 10:00pm was implemented. Reactions of
discontentment were abundant as much in Colombia as in the industries
of Carchi.
An investigation carried out among residents along the border both in
Colombia and Ecuador in respect to the closing of the Rumichaca Bridge
showed that a high percentage of the population (over 60% in Ecuador and
80% in Colombia) viewed the measure as an inconvenience not only because
it affected commerce, but also because of the existence of a number of
illegal crossings that are not controlled. “It is estimated that
there are 60 irregular connections along the entire border.” 3.
Persecution of Colombians
The control over Colombian citizens entering Ecuador became pronounced
in the second part of the year. According to statements of the National
Migration Director, the Police proposed a visa requirement for entry of
Colombian citizens into Ecuador to the Consultative Council of the Migration
Police. They claimed that “the Police is using its migration controls
to deport between 40 and 50 Colombians who are found in the country illegally
on a weekly basis. However, the controls are useless if the following
day the Colombians can re-enter freely”.
This issue has provoked disagreements in the relations between Ecuador
and Colombia. The Minister of Governance affirmed that it is not a question
of bilateral relations but a question of maintaining order along the border
by “closing the crossing to delinquents”. Meanwhile, the Ambassador
of Colombia judged the measure as “hastened”, and he affirmed
that the effects of the Colombian conflict in Ecuador have been exaggerated.
The press referred to the Migration Police as a “permanent hunting
party” that seeks Colombians who lack documents, detains them, and
places them under orders of the authority that has the power to deport
them.
REFUGEES
Colombians come to Ecuador fleeing fumigations and violence that are present
in their country. At the same time, the process of dollarization in Ecuador
has made the country attractive to Colombian manual workers. This has
caused the refugee to become confused with the economic migrant. While
the conditions in which the two arrive are totally distinct, the laws
do not differentiate them, and this makes the situation of the refugee
all the more difficult.
The OIPAZ 2001 Report states that “a large majority of Colombian
families have lost their possessions, homes and property because they
cannot return to their place of origin due to the danger that they face.
There are also people and families who have lost their means of subsistence
through fumigations” . This description continues to be valid for
the year 2002.
In the face of the Colombian government’s decision to intensify
fumigations, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
and other organs prepared themselves to respond to the massive exodus
of Colombians to Ecuador that was expected for 2002. At the beginning
of the year, a UNHCR representative stated, “we have prepared a
Contingency Plan to receive 1500 people who seek refuge in Tulcán.
The budget of the UNHCR is $800,000, with the possibility of increasing
to $1.2 million if the situation worsens. However, while the migratory
flow was high during 2002, it to not reach the expected figure.
According to the figures of the Mobility Office of Sucumbíos, the
flow of refugees to Ecuador increased in July 2002, and the office was
preparing for the daily arrival of about 70 Colombians, the majority of
them women and children. Their motives for fleeing Colombia included the
fumigations that are carried out in the Department of Putumayo and the
increase in armed violence in the border departments of Caquetá
and Huila.
Not all of those who arrive in Ecuador apply for refugee status, and this
leaves them out of statistics and, above all, the possibility of receiving
assistance. While applicants for refugee status are given food packages,
rent, general medical attention, education, kitchen utensils and protection
for a period limited to three months, they cannot work during the phase
of recognition of their refugee status. Nubia Estauri has gone nine months
with a provisional permit: “I cannot work because I do not have
a refugee certificate”, she says. “People see us badly, and
they fear us because we are Colombians”.
Applying refugee status does not guarantee one permanent residence in
the country: of the figures collected by the UNHCR between October 2001
and August 2002, there were 1 442 applications for refugee status, of
which 254 succeeded in being recognized by the Ecuadorian Foreign Ministry.
This represents 17% of the total. SITUATION OF THE REFUGEE
Among the Ecuadorian people, above all those living along the northern
border, there is an attitude of resistance to the Colombian, who is accused
not only of the increase in violence, but also of the decrease in the
number of jobs for Ecuadorians because many small industries and businesses
prefer to hire Colombians.
The media contributes to the negative image and phobia of Colombians through
their reporting, which is based on rumors that are not verified or followed
up. The information tends to be full of generalizations, which are used
to build a new paradigm.
In a September article, the newspaper La Hora of Esmeraldas reported that
“the Ecuadorian population is concerned about the increase in violence
that has accompanied the arrival of many Colombians. Ecuador is preparing
to face the problem by reinforcing the border with military presence.
Another news report claimed: “San Lorenzo is victim of the actions
of Plan Colombia. Due to the fratricidal fight among the neighbours in
Colombia, many residents have emigrated and arrived in San Lorenzo in
search of refuge. This has caused serious social problems. The pages of
newspapers are full of tragic reports of the canton of San Lorenzo, including
permanent crime, lack of basic services, roads in poor condition, unemployment,
invasion of land, schools without teachers, etc.” THE OTHER SIDE
OF THE COIN
In August, the newspaper El Comercio reported: “a Colombian woman
and her three sons is in Ecuador with refugee status. The four fled from
the Cauca Valley because the FARC killed her husband for not having paid
an extortion fee of $770. She explains that “despite the fact that
Ecuador is a peaceful country, the treatment of people is the contrary.
They see us with apathy, and they believe that we’re delinquents
or murderers. It is difficult for us to find apartments to rent.”
The police constantly complains that gangs and kidnappers operating in
the country are led by Colombians. In press releases of the police it
is common to read information that refers to delinquents as having “a
Colombian accent”. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE REFUGEE
In a report dated March 18, the newspaper El Comercio, refers to a census
of Colombians, pointing out that “the city of Santo Domingo continues
to recruit unemployed Colombians, ninety per cent of whom work in the
agricultural rural sector. Their efficiency leads to a higher demand for
their services. The Colombians have introduced new cultivation techniques
and pasture seeds that allow for improvements in production in this region”.
In May, an article regarding the presence of refugees in the province
of Los Ríos (in the south of Ecuador) points out: “Gerardo
Hernández, a Colombian merchant has small businesses in Quito and
Guyaquil in which he gives work to various Ecuadorians: “Here in
Quevedo (a city close to Guyaquil), I look for young people who want to
learn to make paneling”.
In spite of the prohibition and increasingly strict police control, Colombian
refugees find means to work and to earn their daily sustenance. “In
the face of the difficult situation, women refugees have taken on the
initiative to start a business to sell traditional red wine. The business
has 20 sellers who work different routes in the city of Tulcán.
.
Another report talks of children – the sons of Colombian refugees
– who arrive in Tulcán and dedicate themselves to diverse
tasks, among them cleaning the windshields of inter-provincial buses in
the bus terminal.
There is an increasing number of both female and male Colombians, adults
and children, who enter Ecuador. In light of the violent situation in
their country, many say, “in Colombia, the situation is becoming
more and more complicated. One goes to bed and does not know if he will
wake up the next morning. For this, one has to look for a place where
he will be safe”. The Colombians will not let controls or deportations
stop them when it is a matter of life or death for themselves and their
children.
For every person who requests refugee status in Ecuador, there are three
who enter the country illegally. Therefore, what is needed more than military
action is a political decision to face the problem. For the moment, it
has not been addressed from the social, political, or the economic perspective.
The issues need to have a greater presence on the political agenda.
PRODUCED BY: OBSERVATORIO INTERNATIONAL POR LA PAZ (OIPAZ)
(International Observatory for Peace)
DOCUMENTATION: Thania López and Izabella Sowa
REPORT: Susana Rodas
TRANSLATION: Izabella Sowa
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT THE ORGANIZATION THAT ADMINISTERS OIPAZ:
Servicio Paz y Justicia - Ecuador (SERPAJ-E)
Carlos Ibarra 176 y 10 de Agosto
Ed. Yuraj Pirka Of. 8-04
Tel: (593-02) 571 521
Fax: (593-02) 571 636
E-mail: serpaj@ecuanex.net.ec
WEB PAGES:
SERPAJ-E: http://www.serpaj.org.ec
OIPAZ: http://www.oipaz.org.ec
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